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Terrorism and the Media: Legal Responses
INTRODUCTION
PATRICK BAUDE*
During the 1977 baseball World Series, a number of spectators ran onto
the playing field. The delicate sensibilities of television viewers were immediately protected by averting the cameras with the explanation that any
coverage of such disgraceful acts would only feed the latent tendencies of
others to join the unruly. It was hard at that moment to remember that the
same medium regularly covers wars, riots, highjackings and the like, not only
without apology but even with the claim that compelling principles leave no
other course. Whether entertainment based on violence stimulates imitation
or, to the contrary, serves as catharsis is a question more often begged than
answered. As a practical matter, since few are prepared energetically to defend the social virtues of mayhem for the sake of amusement, organized community pressure has at least succeeded in shifting this season's programming
from violence to sex.
News coverage of the world's real violence is a different matter. The
harmful effects of such reporting may be substantial: it can not only stir a
desire for instant celebrity through copying but may also arouse an unreasoning lust for vengefully repressive measures. Yet a society which claims to
respect the minds of its citizens dare not keep too many facts from them.
Hence this symposium, intended to explore how the legal system should respond to recent events of "terrorism."
The word "terrorism" can range in meaning from the style of warfare
said by his critics to have been practiced by Attila the Hun to an isolated act
of psychologically disorganized violence. Professor Paust, in his contribution
to this symposium, for example, gives thorough attention to the use of terrorist strategies of violence and repression by depressingly many national
governments. Transnational violence on such a scale requires an international
response and Professor Paust accordingly discusses large measures aimed at
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the problem. Professor Schornhorst, on the other hand, picks for his subject
an episode in which one violent man took another man hostage to dramatize
a personal grievance. Where one man is held with a shotgun at his head,
responsible officials, as Professor Schornhorst points out, need help not provided by juridical observations alone.
Professor Catton examines the social context of organized violence, suggesting that terrorists commit terrorism for widely different but not,
therefore, wholly obscure reasons. In some cases, those reasons will include the
desire for notoriety or publicity, a desire most readily denied by control of the
press. Professors Jaehnig and Terry explore specifically the question whether
such control can realistically be expected from the press itself and, if not,
whether governmental coercion is possible, necessary, or even tolerable.
The issues examined in this symposium are thus as diverse as the subject
itself. The most important ideological question is whether one sees terrorism
as a problem in its own right. If it is, then it requires its own solution. To
some, this solution will be the elimination of perceived injustice to which
powerless people lack effective response; to others the solution will be swift incapacitation of all who make society their enemy. But if terrorism encompasses the many problems of Palestine, of land finance in Indianapolis, of
American racism and Italian politics, limiting terrorism will not be a unitary
program.
One strand of current comment in the United States is that we may be
subjected to the spectacle of our leaders meeting the fate of Aldo Moro.
No doubt providently, American corporate executives already arrange for
their chauffeurs to attend a school in California where drivers are taught to
evade kidnappers. Maybe ironically, the most spectacular of these driving tactics, the "bootleg turn," was perfected by American outlaws fifty years ago.
The United States Constitution itself is no stranger to violence, conceived
as it was in revolution. Many of the formative first amendment cases dealt
with early twentieth-century efforts to control what would now be called "terrorism," with laws like New York's "Criminal Anarchy" statute passed in
response to the assassination of President McKinley.' The incitement of illegal
violence remains a familiar theme in constitutional law. 2 Although the
Supreme Court has not yet defined the right of the press to gain access to
places where hostages are being held, there is every reason to suppose that the
Court would continue its refusal to insist that the press be admitted when the
public is excluded.3 And if the press should learn things the immediate
revealing of which would endanger lives, it is likely that publication could be
restrained by analogy to "publication of the sailing dates of transports" 4 in
time of war. In short, this symposium asks what the law should do about terrorism; one answer may be to do what it has always done.
'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
'E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
'Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
'Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).

